In this paper, we present a novel attack tree paradigm called attack countermeasure tree (ACT) 
1.INTRODUCTION
The concept of attack trees is introduced from fault trees in software safety. Fault trees are used to describe how errors disseminate in software systems, and analysis of this could be used to exam software [10] and [11] . Although fault trees are most commonly used to model how problems occur in critical systems, given the built in focus on error propagation, attack trees have a slightly dissimilar perspective. The starter of an attacker, or group of attackers, makes it believable to model extortion to an institute as well as the aspect of targeted attacks. Deliberations of likelihoods based on existing money, tools or incentive for the attacker provides a more carefully grounded duplicate of the risk level. Bruce Schneier offered the concept of attack trees as a way to model threats against computer systems [12] The basic tree model describes the Attack Tree with two different types of nodes, AND-nodes, and OR-nodes. At OR-nodes, a smallest of one sub-goal should be fulfilled to achieve the goal of the node. At AND-nodes, every sub-goal should be achieved to realize the objective of the node. The Boolean calculation could be done on the values of sub goal nodes based on a Boolean expression (AND-/OR) in the node, giving the following account in the node [9] .
To evaluate the safety of the system security, modeling is used.Regular step towards security assessment is to plan and build a scalable model [12] , [13] that helps to compute the security [14] in terms of important characteristics such as the damage produced by an outbreak or the gain achieved by implementing a certain set of countermeasures [15] . The simplest model issued in this context is attack tree (AT) [1] . AT utilize the genetic algorithms to find optimal countermeasure sets for the system from their AT models [6] . Though, the basic construct of AT does not take into account defense mechanisms. Roy et al. developed a novel attack tree model called attack countermeasure tree (ACT). The ACT is built on following deliberation, A) defense mechanisms not restricted to not just at the leaf B) Mincuts are used to generate and analysis of the attack and the attack countermeasure scenarios. C) Security analysis using various measures is performed in an integrated manner [1] .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A brief related work is presented in section II. In Section III, Split-protocol architecture presented. In Section IV, describe Split-protocol configurations V. Describes attack countermeasure tree (ACT). VI. Present quantitative and qualitative analysis. Some simulation results and the impact Split-protocol using ACT on security analysis are discussed. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
2.RELATED WORK
A security risk is being modeled using a graphical, mathematical, decision tree structure called an attack tree. There is cause to believe that attack trees are widely patronized by the intelligence community. Fault trees were invented in the early 1960s for use in the Minuteman Missile System [16] . Weiss described the threat logic trees [17] . Amoroso [18] detailed a modeling concept he called threat trees. Then, Schneider [19] (noted security expert) promoted the idea though he called it attack trees (AT). Moore et.al [20] prolonged Schneider's AT by familiarizing attack scenarios and attack profiles. Mauw et.al [21] developed an alternative formalism for AT where the goal was associated with the set of all mincuts. When applied to complex case studies, AT often became large and unwieldy. Therefore, Daley [22] proposed a layered approach to partition attack tree nodes with respect to their functionality.
To the best of our knowledge, a technique for splitting an HTTP-based TCP connection in this manner has not been proposed previously. Splitting is similar to mask failures in TCP [23] and to use the M-TCP (Migratory TCP) protocol to migrate TCP connections from one server to another [24] . However, connection migration in M-TCP does not involve splitting an HTTP request and TCP connection or operating in split mode. Moreover, the client needs to initiate the migration process in M-TCP, whereas TCP connection splitting is transparent to the client. TCP connection splitting is also different from migrating Web applications in mobile computing [25] , which moves applications from one node to another on the Web by using virtualization techniques. Likewise, connection splitting is different from process migration in [26] , which requires that an agent be dispatched from one system to run on another at a remote location.
3.SPLIT-PROTOCOL ARCHITECTURE
The basic split protocol architecture used for the experiments described in [2] is reproduced here for illustration as shown in Figure 1 . The http request is splited at the GET command between a CS and a DS. The CS handles the connections, and the DS handles the data transfer. connections, the CS also handles knowledge of the requested file, its nam the file itself. However, the DS has the file and serves the data to the client.
After the GET command is received by CS delegate message DM1 to DS. The message DM1 that is stored in CS in the configuration When DM1 reaches the DS, it creates its TCB entry and starts processing this request as if it initiated itselfin the DS. When a DS sends data to the hadreceivedan FIN-ACK from the server packet referred to as DM2 to DS. The DM2 received by DS will close the state of the request in DS. These DM1 and DM2 inter at DS. More details of the design and imple
The CS and DS architecture illustrated in Figure 1 provides a variety of delegation configurations of given requests. A request received by DS. That is, some requests can variation of delegation ratio. As CS and DS are identical functional units, they can also perform any given role of CS or a DS. During these percentage is 25% in both directions (CS and DS) [4] , we achieved the maximum throughput. The measurements indicated that the optimal split server performance was (maximum can be 2.0). Thus, the two server). These initial results provided us motivation to construct split protocol based servers as described below. These novel splitting techniques and associated Web server architecture introduced in this section also showed some p server reliability. handles the data ACKs and the connection closing. The CS has complete knowledge of the requested file, its name, size, and other attributes, but it may or may not have the file itself. However, the DS has the file and serves the data to the client. the GET command is received by CS, it sends an ACK to the client and also sends a delegate message DM1 to DS. The message DM1 contains the state infprmation configuration of an entry in the TCP table (known as a TCB entry). DM1 reaches the DS, it creates its TCB entry and starts processing this request as if it
. When a DS sends data to the client, it uses the CS's IP. After CS from the client to signify connection closing, it sends another inter server packet referred to as DM2 to DS. The DM2 received by DS will close the state of the request in DS. These DM1 and DM2 inter-server packets serve as the start and end of the at DS. More details of the design and implementation can be found in [3] .
The CS and DS architecture illustrated in Figure 1 provides a variety of delegation configurations A request received by CS can be either processed wholly at CS or delegated to can be handled at CS and some can be transferred to DS resulting in a variation of delegation ratio. As CS and DS are identical functional units, they can also perform any given role of CS or a DS. During these experiments, we found that when the delegatio percentage is 25% in both directions (CS and DS) [4] , we achieved the maximum throughput. The measurements indicated that the optimal split server performance was 1.8035 for two servers (maximum can be 2.0). Thus, the two-server system suffers only 20% capacity (10% for each ). These initial results provided us motivation to construct split protocol based servers as described below. These novel splitting techniques and associated Web server architecture introduced in this section also showed some potential in distributed computing and improving CS and a DS. The CS handles the connections, and the DS handles the data transfer. Also to the data ACKs and the connection closing. The CS has complete e, size, and other attributes, but it may or may not have and also sends a infprmation of the request as a TCB entry). DM1 reaches the DS, it creates its TCB entry and starts processing this request as if it was it uses the CS's IP. After CS it sends another interserver packet referred to as DM2 to DS. The DM2 received by DS will close the state of the server packets serve as the start and end of the request
The CS and DS architecture illustrated in Figure 1 provides a variety of delegation configurations CS can be either processed wholly at CS or delegated to to DS resulting in a variation of delegation ratio. As CS and DS are identical functional units, they can also perform we found that when the delegation percentage is 25% in both directions (CS and DS) [4] , we achieved the maximum throughput.
1.8035 for two servers capacity (10% for each ). These initial results provided us motivation to construct split protocol based servers as described below. These novel splitting techniques and associated Web server architecture otential in distributed computing and improving
5.SPLIT CONFIGURATIONS
Configuration 2 in Fig. 2 shows a single CS with two or more DSs in the system with partial or full delegation. In partial delegation mode, clients designated as non request clients (NSRCs) send requests to the CS, and these requests are processed completely by the CS as usual. The connections between the NSRCs and the CSs are shown as dotted lines. With full (SRCs) make requests to the CS, and these requests are delegated to DSs. For full delegation, there are no NSRCs in the system. When requests are delegated to DSs, we assume that they are equally dist fashion. It is also possible to employ other distribution strategies 
CONFIGURATIONS
Configuration 2 in Fig. 2 shows a single CS with two or more DSs in the system with In partial delegation mode, clients designated as non request clients (NSRCs) send requests to the CS, and these requests are processed completely by the CS as usual. The connections between the NSRCs and the CSs are shown as dotted lines. With full delegation, clients designated as split-request clients (SRCs) make requests to the CS, and these requests are delegated to DSs. For full delegation, there are no NSRCs in the system. When requests are delegated to DSs, we assume that they are equally distributed among DS1, DS2 and DS3 in round fashion. It is also possible to employ other distribution strategies [4] . Figure 3 shows a general configuration for connecting one DS, one or more CSs and one or more . It shows two CSs and one DS with both SRCs and NSRCs. For this configuration, we used small file sizes to avoid overloading the single DS [4] . Fig. 2 shows a single CS with two or more DSs in the system with In partial delegation mode, clients designated as non-split request clients (NSRCs) send requests to the CS, and these requests are processed completely by the CS as usual. The connections between the NSRCs and the CSs are request clients (SRCs) make requests to the CS, and these requests are delegated to DSs. For full delegation, there are no NSRCs in the system. When requests are delegated to DSs, we ributed among DS1, DS2 and DS3 in round-robin CSs and one or more and one DS with both SRCs and NSRCs. For this Figure 4 describes a general configuration for or more clients (Configuration 3.). Various split configurations are useful according to the need of system functionality. Example if we need a faster data transfer for /Multi Server (MC/MS) configuration best ch a connection with one connection server, and concurrent data servers located on different subnets from each other. The data can be clients anywhere on the network, which then reassemble or otherwise process the data. MC/MS distributes the data of large file across multiple servers without any redundancy. The separation of data transfer from a connection establishment is entirely transparent to the a general configuration for connecting multiple CSs, and various or more clients (Configuration 3.). Various split configurations are useful according to the need of system functionality. Example if we need a faster data transfer for alarge file, then Multi Client /Multi Server (MC/MS) configuration best choice. In MC/MS architecture, one client establishes a connection with one connection server, and concurrent data transfer dispatched from multiple data servers located on different subnets from each other. The data can be sent to the multiple ere on the network, which then reassemble or otherwise process the data. MC/MS distributes the data of large file across multiple servers without any redundancy. The separation of data transfer from a connection establishment is entirely transparent to the client. In this subsection, the basic formalism of ACT is reproduced. classes of events: attack events (e.g., install a keystroke logger), keystroke logger) and mitigation ACT for a regular server system (non Figure 5 (a) shows simple ACT with a single probability of success a successful attack at goal node
In figure 5 (b), one attack event and one detection mechanism are applied. The corresponding expression for the probability of an undetected attack at goal node is shown Eq.(1)..
For n, detection mechanisms are being used to detect one attack event equation becomes. The corresponding P Goal is:
In figure 5 (c), one attack event, one detection mechanism corresponding expression for the probability of an undetected attack at goal node is shown Eq.(4). In this subsection, the basic formalism of ACT is reproduced. In ACT, there are three classes of events: attack events (e.g., install a keystroke logger), discovery events (e.g., keystroke logger) and mitigation activities (e.g., get rid of keystroke logger).
ACT for a regular server system (non-Split system) Figure 5 (a) shows simple ACT with a single-attack event. The corresponding expression for the probability of success a successful attack at goal node is shown Eq. (1).
(1)
For n, detection mechanisms are being used to detect one attack event equation becomes.
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figure 5(c), one attack event, one detection mechanism, and mitigation events are applied. The corresponding expression for the probability of an undetected attack at goal node is shown Eq.(4). ACT with one attack and one detection ACT with one attack,one detection event and onemitigation event for he corresponding expression for the probability of success a
and with Spliton CS and DS represents ACT protocol. Figure 8 . shows one attack event, n detection expression 8 displays the probability of a successful attack was detected but not successfully mitigated. Figure 8 . ACT without Split Figure 8 . shows aSplit system with one attack event, n detection The corresponding expression 9 detected, or attack was detected but not successfully mitigated. one attack event, n detection events, and n mitigation events. The corresponding the probability of a successful attack, either attack was not attack was detected but not successfully mitigated.
ሺ െ ܲ‫݅ܦ‬ሻሻሻ ൈ ሺ1 െ ∏ ሺ1 െ ܲ‫݅ܯ‬ሻሻሻ ୀ Figure 8 . ACT without Split-protocol for multiple detection and mitigation events [ system with one attack event, n detection events, and n mitigation The corresponding expression 9 shows the probability of a successful attack; either attack or attack was detected but not successfully mitigated. Figure 11 . shows ACT structure with asplit system with one attack event, n pairs of detection event. The corresponding expression 11 displays the probability of The the probability of successful attack.
events [1] .
, n pairs of detection the probability of pairs of detection and mitigation events. *for identical inputs [1] attack tree for resetting the BGP session. In both AT and ACT, the with the set of all mincuts.Mincuts ofAT represent attack scenarios [ whereas those of an ACT, represent attack-countermeasure scenarios straightforward attack tree for resetting the BGP session [1] ( A 111 7. System failure rate is 1 -R (T) where R (T) indicated the reliability of the whole system.
7.QUALITATIVE AND

Probabilistic Analysis
AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS WITH
There are supposed "n" protocol components and probability of non-failure (of each component(x1, x2, x3, x4...) are exponentially distributed: For simplicity we will assume, every i^th component 1 ≤ i ≤ n probability of failure is equal to all component, i.e. Failure Rate (FR) for each component is same and (θi (τ) = θi). For given operational time and all system, components are identical and their failure time is independent. Therefore, the reliability of, any ithcomponent (1 <i< n) reliability "Π i(τ)": "Π i (τ)" = P(Xi> τ) = ݁ ୧த =>θ i =-ln(Π i (τ))/ τ .
First, we have assumed identical components, which are identical DS in a cluster System, and they have same FR. Also, they are independent components those whose failure does not affect the performance of any other system component [2] .
Reliability of Parallel identical components:
For example system of two parallel components (CS, DS) This system hazard rate θs(τ) can be calculated as a function of any mission time τ [3] .
Mincut Analysis
According to Roy, et 
Qualitative Analysis:
Minimal cut set (mincut): a minimum combination of primary events that induce the top event Introducing Split-protocol increase length of mincut, which signals low vulnerability. The split does not introduce additional new cut sets. This implies that the inclusion of split system does not introduce additional vulnerability in the overall system. Split-protocol reduces thechance of a single point of failure. Spilt -protocol introduces n parallel components, to fail system all n component must be faulty. The splitprotocol offers inbuilt architecture reliability and fault tolerance against DoS/DDoS attack [8] .
8.CONCLUSION
In this paper,we have presented the attack countermeasure trees (ACT) with implementing, a nonstate-space representation that permits us to perform qualitative and probabilistic analysis of the security of the system. ACT takes into account attacks as well as countermeasures (in the form of detection mechanisms and mitigation techniques). The detection and mitigation can be placed not just at the leaf node but also at any intermediate node. When we implement the Split-protocol in thesystem, it reduces the probability of system failure by 50%. If thesystemis made of n split unit, system reliability will improve by n times. The innovative splitting system and associated Web server architecture introduced in this paper have potential applications in distributed computing and improving server reliability.
